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IS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IMMORAL EVEN IF IT DOES DETER MURDER? 
Thomas Kleven* 
 After years of inconclusive debate, recent studies 
purport to demonstrate that capital punishment does indeed 
deter murder,1 perhaps to the tune of multiple saved lives 
for each person executed.2 The basic thrust of the findings 
appears to be that, while at low levels of execution there 
is no deterrent effect and even a brutalizing effect that 
increases murder, beyond some threshold level of executions 
capital punishment is an effective deterrent, that the 
impact is greater the swifter the punishment is imposed, and 
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1 See, e,g., Harold Brumm & Dale O. Cloninger, Perceived Risk of 
Punishmentand the Commission of Homicides: A Covariance Structure Analysis,
31 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1996); Dale O. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, 
Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi-Controlled Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED 
ECON. 569 (2001); Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, Does Capital 
Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence From Postmoratorium Panel 
Data, 5 AM. J. L. & ECON. 344 (2003); Zhiqiang Liu, Capital Punishment and 
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EASTERN ECON. J. 237 (2004); H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off 
Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital 
Punishment, 46 J. Law & Econ. 453 (2003); Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of 
Passion, Execution Delays, and the Deterrence of Capital Punishment, 33 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 283 (2004); Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence versus Brutalization: 
Capital Punishment’s Differing Impacts Among States, 104 U. MICH. L. REV.
203 (2005); Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the 
Incidence of Murder, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 163 (2004).  As always with respect 
to such complicated empirical matters, there are studies as well that 
purport to show no deterrent effect.  See, e.g., Craig J. Albert, 
Challenging Deterrence, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 371 (1999); KEITH HARRIS & DERRAL 
CHEATWOOD, THE GEOGRAPHY OF EXECUTION: THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT QUAGMIRE IN AMERICA 
(1997); Lawrence Katz, Steven D. Levitt & Ellen Shustorovich, Prison 
Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318 
(2003); Jon Sorenson, Robert Wrinkle, Victoria Brewer & James Marquart, 
Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Examining the Effect of Executions on 
Murder in Texas, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 481 (1999).   
2 See Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, supra note 1 (18 fewer murders per 
execution); Shepherd (2004), supra note 1 (3 fewer murders); Zimmerman, 
supra note 1 (14 fewer murders).        
2that by and large it works to deter all types of murder and 
among both whites and blacks. 
 In response to these studies, Professors Sunstein and 
Vermeule have argued that since capital punishment leads to 
a net savings of innocent lives, it may be morally required 
on consequentialist grounds.3 There is currently a heated 
public debate over capital punishment, with some proposing 
its abolition and others pushing to increase its use.4 If 
these studies and arguments such as Sunstein’s and 
Vermeules’s are found persuasive, they may help sway the 
debate and could contribute to a dramatic increase in the 
number of executions.5
3 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally 
Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 
(2005). 
4 On the one hand, for example, we have the Governor of Illinois 
imposing a moratorium on death sentences per doubts about the fairness 
of the defendants’ trials.  Dirk Johnson, “Illinois, Citing Faulty 
Verdicts Bars Executions,” New York Times, Feb. 1, 2000.  On the other 
hand, we have Massachusetts and New York considering reinstating capital 
punishment, and proposals in Congress to speed up the execution process 
by limiting appeals to federal courts.  Pam Belluck, “Massachusetts 
Governor Urges Death Penalty,” New York Times, Apr. 29, 2005; Al Baker, 
“Republicans Seek a Bipartisan Vote on a Bill to Reinstate the State’s 
Death Penalty,” New York Times, Mar. 3, 2005; “Republicans want to speed 
up death penalty,” Reuters News Service, July 6, 2005.       
5 In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. (1972), the Supreme Court imposed a 
moratorium on capital punishment pending what it perceived to be needed 
procedural reform.  As states began to reform their laws, the Court 
sanctioned the resumption of capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia 
(1976) and companion cases.  Between 1976 and 2003 there were 885 
executions, and as of the end of 2003 there were 3,374 persons under 
sentence of death.  Thomas B. Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, “Capital 
Punishment, 2003,” Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin 5, 10, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp03.pdf. Between 1976 and 2002, 
there were 544,885 homicides.  After remaining fairly constant over most 
of that period the homicide rate dropped significantly in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s; between 1999-2002 there were an average of 15,837 
homicides per year.  James Alan Fox & Marianne W. Zawitz, “Homicide 
3I shall argue here, even assuming the validity of the 
studies,6 that capital punishment cannot be justified in the 
United States in the current historical context for reasons 
of justice that trump consequentialist considerations.  Mine 
is not an argument that capital punishment is absolutely 
immoral, since in a sufficiently just society I think it can 
be justified.  Rather the point is that the United States is 
not that society, that capital punishment threatens to 
perpetuate the society’s present injustices, and that 
substantial societal reform must first be undertaken before 
 
Trends in the United States,” Bureau of Justice Statistics at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/totalstab.htm. Given these 
numbers, a sharp increase in the use of capital punishment could easily 
produce many thousands of executions.            
6 All the studies appear to be rigorous multi-variable regression 
analyses.  As such, they may well influence the public debate over 
whether and how extensively capital punishment should be practiced.  If 
the studies are accurate, an increase in executions might save even more 
lives.  But as with all scientific analyses of causal relations, the 
validity of the methodology will always be open to question.  See, e.g., 
Richard Berk, New Claims about Executions and General Deterrence: Deja 
Vu All Over Again? 2 J. EMP. L. STUD. 303 (2005) (criticizing the recent 
studies’ methodology and conclusions, in particular the Mocan & Gittings 
study); John J. Donahue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical 
Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 836 
(2005)(discussing the technical difficulty of accurately assessing the 
deterrent effect of capital punishment, critiquing the recent empirical 
studies as having failed to do so, and concluding that “neither adoption 
nor abolition of the death penalty could reliably be causally linked to 
homicide rates,” and that “one cannot confidently conclude that the 
evidence points to either deterrent or antideterrent effects”).  In 
addition, as with the studies purporting to show no deterrent effect, 
supra note 1, there will always be some uncertainty as to the existence 
and extent of the causal connection between capital punishment and the 
murder rate.  There is no uncertainty, however, about what will happen 
if the pro-deterrence studies contribute to the current push in this 
society for more and swifter executions.  If that comes about, thousands 
more people are likely to be executed.  It is imperative, therefore, 
that these studies be subjected to extensive critical inquiry.  Beyond 
that, even if the studies are accurate, it is equally important to 
debate their policy and moral significance.   
4capital punishment could be considered justifiable.  At that 
point it is an open question whether capital punishment 
would even be needed as a deterrent to murder. 
 Part A of the paper details Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s 
thesis and sets forth points of agreement.  In particular, I 
agree that consequentialist or utilitarian considerations 
have a prominent place in a just society, and that any 
society must make decisions that trade off life against 
life.  That is why capital punishment cannot be ruled out as 
an abstract proposition under any and all social conditions.   
Part B addresses the question of blameworthiness, 
focusing specifically on juveniles and the mentally 
impaired.  Since they oppose the execution of innocent 
people even if that would deter murder, Sunstein’s and 
Vermeule’s consequentialist case for capital punishment 
assumes that it is only justifiable to execute those who are 
morally responsible for their acts.  Yet they seem to 
support on deterrence grounds the execution of juveniles and 
the mentally impaired, implying that they view them as 
morally responsible for the murders they commit.  Part B 
discusses objections to executing juveniles and the mentally 
impaired, on grounds that they are not sufficiently 
blameworthy to justify the ultimate punishment, and 
concludes that these objections have merit.    
5Part C addresses the issue of social injustice as a 
cause contributing to murder.  I argue that the 
consequentialist justification for capital punishment is 
morally permissible only under conditions of substantial 
social justice, and that those conditions do not now pertain 
in the United States, in particular as to the disadvantaged 
segments of society among whom murder is most common.  Part 
D briefly concludes. 
A.  The Consequentialist Argument  
In light of evidence purporting to show that capital 
punishment deters murder, Sunstein and Vermeule argue from a 
consequentialist or utilitarian perspective that society may 
have a moral obligation to employ it.  The logic of the 
argument, as I understand it, proceeds as follows: 
a. No valid distinction exists between government action 
and inaction, such that government’s failure to act 
to save lives is the moral equivalent of its 
affirmatively taking life. 
b. Absent countervailing considerations, of which the 
action/non-action distinction does not consist, 
government ought to act so as to preserve life. 
c. When faced with life-life trade-offs, i.e., when 
lives will be lost whether the government chooses to 
6act or not to act, it ought (i.e., is morally 
obligated) to choose to maximize life. 
d. To the extent capital punishment deters more murders 
than those executed for committing murder, and to the 
extent that other less drastic means to accomplish 
the same end are unavailable, it maximizes life and 
therefore should be practiced. 
In this section I discuss areas of agreement with the 
argument, and in subsequent sections areas of disagreement.  
First, I agree that there is no valid moral distinction 
between government action and inaction.  Therefore, for the 
government to allow someone to die when it could take steps 
to prevent it is comparable from a moral perspective to the 
affirmative taking of someone’s life.  Therefore, the 
argument that it is absolutely immoral for the government to 
execute someone for murder is incoherent when doing so 
deters murder, because under those circumstances it would be 
equally immoral not to execute murderers so as to prevent 
murder.  Therefore, moral considerations other than the 
act/non-act distinction must be employed to resolve the 
question of whether to engage in capital punishment. 
 The reason why government action and inaction are 
morally equivalent is two-fold.  First, at least when the 
government is capable of acting and has knowledge of the 
7consequences of its choice to act or not, the choice not to 
act is in itself an action.  This makes the act/non-act 
distinction logically and morally incoherent.  Second, the 
very purpose of government is to promote society’s welfare.  
While varying moral perspectives are possible as regards 
what society may or may not do, or must or must not do, in 
promoting welfare, given the incoherence of the act/non-act                  
distinction it seems unlikely that any of the political 
philosophies that undergird this society would absolutely 
ban capital punishment.     
Utilitarianism certainly wouldn’t support an absolute 
ban because by definition it requires government to maximize 
society’s welfare,7 and if practicing capital punishment 
would do so then that’s what should be done.  This is 
essentially Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s argument.  Nor would 
libertarianism support an absolute ban because by definition 
it requires government to protect people’s right to live as 
they see fit so long as they don’t interfere with others’ 
commensurate right,8 and if executing murderers would help 
promote people’s right not to be murdered then that’s what 
 
7 See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the theory of rational 
behavior, in AMARTYA SEN & BERNARD WILLIAMS, EDS., UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39 
(1982); Henry R. West, Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility in HARLAN 
B. MILLER & WILLIAM H. WILLIAMS, EDS., THE LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 23 (1982). 
8 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).  
8should be done.9 Nor would Rawlsian egalitarianism support 
an absolute ban because its first principle requires that 
“each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for 
others,”10 one of which basic liberties would have to be the 
right not to deprived of life without just cause, and if 
executing murderers would deter  violations of that right 
then that’s what should be done.11 
9 Some libertarians view the right to life as inalienable, and argue 
that capital punishment violates the murderer’s right to life despite 
the murderer’s having violated the victim’s right.  See, e.g., George H. 
Smith, A Killer’s Right to Life, 10 LIBERTY 46 (1996).  Others view 
murderers as having forfeited the right to assert their own right to 
life, and support capital punishment as justifiable retribution for 
violating the victim’s right to life or per society’s interest in 
promoting the libertarian principle of non-aggression against others.  
See, e.g., N. Stephan Kinsella, A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and 
Rights, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 609 (1997); J. Charles King, A Rationale 
for Punishment, 4 JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES 151 (1980).  Libertarians 
tend to favor retributive and restitutive theories of punishment, and to 
oppose punishment for the sake of deterring others.  See, e.g., Randy E. 
Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the 
Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 166 (1996)(“Criminal law 
only incidentally concerns the use of punishment to deter others from 
committing crimes in the future”).  The objection to deterrence as a 
justification flows from libertarianism’s commitment to the principle 
that no one may be compelled to serve the interests of others against 
their will.  See NOZICK, supra note 8, at ix, 33-34.  But where there are 
harms (like murder) for which restitution is impossible and no 
compensation is adequate, society as a whole has a legitimate interest 
in preventing those harms.  Therefore, deterrence seems consistent with 
libertarian principles, so long as sanctions are imposed on those who 
because of their acts deserve to be punished and not on innocent people.  
See, e.g., King, supra at 158 (“[E]veryone...has reason to wish to see a 
practice followed that will raise the cost of violating the principles 
of right and thereby discourage people from doing so...A chief point of 
the whole practice is to deter, but the practice does not thereby allow 
punishing those who have committed no offense.”).      
10 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971). 
11 Rawls does not develop a full theory of punishment and does not 
directly discuss capital punishment.  He does say that “the purpose of 
the criminal law is to uphold basic natural duties, those which forbid 
us to injure other persons in their life and limb, or to deprive them of 
their liberty and property, and punishments are to serve this end.” 
9This does not yet mean that utilitarianism, 
libertarianism and egalitarianism would require capital 
punishment, but only that they would not absolutely ban it.  
In fact, in some instances all three approaches would 
counsel against capital punishment and require that it not 
be employed.  Suppose, for example, that practicing capital 
punishment would produce more rather than less murders.  
Then practicing it would violate utilitarianism by 
detracting from rather than promoting society’s welfare, 
would violate libertarianism since government would then be 
contributing to rather than protecting against the violation 
of people’s libertarian rights, and would violate 
egalitarianism by undermining the right not to be deprived 
of life without just cause.   
 
RAWLS, supra note 10, at 314.  And that “(h)aving agreed to these 
principles [of justice] in view of the reasons already surveyed, it is 
rational to authorize the measures needed to maintain just institutions, 
assuming that the constraints of equal liberty and the rule of law are 
duly recognized.”  Id. at 576.  To me this suggests that it might well 
be justifiable in a generally just society to execute those who 
intentionally and unjustifiably deprive others of their lives and who 
are mentally competent enough to be deemed blameworthy for their acts; 
but if, and only if, it can adequately be shown that capital punishment 
deters murder more so than other measures that don’t deprive the 
murderer of his own life.  Otherwise it would not be “needed to maintain 
just institutions.”  In other contexts, however, capital punishment 
seems more problematic.  For example, it would seem unjustifiable to 
execute thieves, even if execution were the most effective deterrent, 
because the punishment imposed on the thief is disproportionate to the 
injustice that thievery entails.  And it would seem unjustifiable to 
execute those subjected to social injustices that causally contribute to 
the murders they commit, since then capital punishment would be helping 
to maintain unjust institutions.     
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That moral thinking neither absolutely bans nor 
absolutely requires capital punishment, but rather sometimes 
supports and sometimes counsels against it depending on the 
circumstances, is what leads Sunstein and Vermeule to 
conclude that an empirical analysis of the actual impact of 
capital punishment is necessary to the moral decision of 
whether to practice it.  I agree with their argument up to 
this point, that is, I agree that capital punishment can at 
times be justified on moral grounds.  However, for reasons 
to be developed below I do not think that capital punishment 
can be justified in this society at this historical 
juncture, whereas I take Sunstein and Vermeule to argue that 
it can be. 
A second area of agreement is with the notions that 
absent countervailing considerations society ought to act so 
as to preserve life, that in so doing government will often 
have to make life against life trade-offs, and that in 
making such decisions the goal should be to maximize life.  
That society should preserve life, and a goal of preserving 
more rather than less life, follows from all the 
philosophies discussed above.  And that life-life trade-offs 
unavoidably impact many if not most government decisions – 
capital punishment, going to war, environmental regulation, 
social welfare benefits, constructing highways, and many 
11
more – is apparent.  However, countervailing moral 
considerations may at times compete with the 
consequentialist argument for capital punishment, and in my 
judgment Sunstein and Vermeule do not give adequate play to 
such considerations, in particular to the related issues of 
murderers’ blameworthiness for their acts and of the impact 
of social injustices in contributing to murder.  The next 
two parts address these considerations. 
B.  The Question of Blameworthiness – Executing Juveniles  
 and the Mentally Impaired 
 
Sunstein and Vermeule limit their analysis to the 
consequentialist goal of preventing murder.  This 
intentionally avoids the question of whether capital 
punishment is morally justifiable or required for 
retributive reasons irrespective of its deterrent effect.12 
Consequently, they do not address the question of a 
murderer’s blameworthiness for the act of committing murder.  
While blameworthiness is an essential and sticky component 
of a retributive justification for capital punishment, I 
 
12 For retributive arguments in favor of capital punishment, see, e.g., 
Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of the Death Penalty, in HUGO ADAM BEDAU & PAUL 
G. CASSELL, EDS., DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY 183, 197 (2004)(“Capital 
punishment’s retributive function vindicates the fundamental moral 
principles that a criminal should receive his just deserts.  Even if 
capital punishment had no incapacitative or deterrent utility, its use 
would be justified on this basis alone.”); Louis P. Pojman, Why the 
Death Penalty Is Morally Permissible, id., at 51, 56 (“Intentionally 
taking the life of an innocent human being is so evil that absent 
mitigating circumstances, the perpetrator forfeits his own right to 
life.  He or she deserves to die.”). 
12
also think it relevant to and problematic for a 
consequentialist rationale.  This is especially so with 
regard to juveniles and the mentally impaired in light of 
Supreme Court decisions banning their execution on moral 
grounds,13 strong public sentiments opposed to executing 
 
13 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316, 318 (2002)(banning the 
execution of the mentally retarded as cruel and unusual punishment on 
the grounds that “today our society views mentally retarded offenders as 
categorically less culpable than the average criminal”; and that: 
“Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right 
and wrong and are competent to stand trial... Their deficiencies do not 
warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their 
personal culpability.”); Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1196 
(2005)(banning the execution of juveniles under 18 at the time of the 
offense: “Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community's moral 
outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the 
victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with 
an adult.  Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe 
penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is 
diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and 
immaturity.”); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)(banning the 
execution of the insane: “For today, no less than before, we may 
seriously question the retributive value of executing a person who has 
no comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his 
fundamental right to life... Similarly, the natural abhorrence civilized 
societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with 
his own conscience or deity is still vivid today.  And the intuition 
that such an execution simply offends humanity is evidently shared 
across this Nation.  Faced with such widespread evidence of a 
restriction upon sovereign power, this Court is compelled to conclude 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence 
of death upon a prisoner who is insane.  Whether its aim be to protect 
the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to 
protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting 
mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth 
Amendment.”).  Admittedly these points are debatable, as evidenced by 
the closeness of the cases, with Roper and Ford being 5-4 decisions and 
Atkins 6-3.  The point is that without that debate advocating the 
execution of juveniles and the mentally impaired on consequentialist 
grounds is incomplete. 
13
them,14 and the large numbers likely to be executed if the 
consequentialist argument holds sway.15 
Although they do not discuss the issue of 
blameworthiness, Sunstein and Vermeule seem aware of it when 
they attempt to skirt, unsuccessfully I think, the question 
of whether their analysis would also justify executing 
innocent people if that would on balance save yet more 
innocent lives through its deterrent impact on murder.  Thus 
they say, though without explaining why, that “[o]f course 
it is prima facie objectionable, worse than outrageous, if 
the state proposes to kill people whom it knows to be 
innocent.”16 But why should that be so if it would deter 
the murder of even more people?  For example, to the extent 
 
14 In a 2003 Gallup poll 75% of the respondents opposed the death 
penalty for the mentally ill, 82% for the mentally retarded, and 69% for 
juveniles.  Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t251.pdf. 
15 As of year end 2003, 67 (representing 2% of the total) of prisoners 
under sentence of death were under 18 years of age at the time of 
arrest; 341 (or 11% of the total) were between 18-19; and 843 (or 27% of 
the total) were between 20-24.  Bonczar & Snell, supra note 5,  Table 7, 
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp03.pdf. Between 1976 and 
2002, 66,764 homicide offenders (representing 11% of the total 
offenders) were under the age of 18 at the time of the offense; another 
218,648 homicide offenders (representing 36% of the total) were between 
18-24.  Fox & Zawitz, supra note 5, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
homicide/tables/oagetab.htm. Given these numbers, widespread use of 
capital punishment against juvenile and other youthful offenders would 
produce hundreds if not thousands of executions.    
16 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 737.  This is actually a 
contradiction in terms.  To say that knowingly executing the innocent is 
“worse than outrageous” implies that it can’t be justified, but to say 
that it is only “prima facie objectionable” only creates a presumption 
that could conceivably be overcome, for example by a consequentialist 
showing that intentionally executing the innocent would save even more 
innocent lives.  This contradiction demonstrates, I think, Sunstein’s 
and Vermeule’s ambivalence over the issue of blameworthiness.       
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that potential murderers value their loved ones’ lives more 
than their own, an entirely plausible assumption in many 
instances, then executing murders’ loved ones might well 
deter more murders than would executing the murderers 
themselves.  If that seems objectionable on moral grounds 
despite the net saving of life, whereas executing murderers 
does not, it must be because murderers are thought 
blameworthy whereas their loved ones are not and because 
absent blameworthiness knowingly executing an innocent 
person in order to deter murder is deemed immoral – for 
example, because it violates the innocent person’s 
fundamental right to life.17 
17 Given the virtual impossibility of employing capital punishment 
without error, it is inevitable that some innocent people will be 
executed.  If these knowing executions are to be distinguished from 
executing other innocent people such as murderer’s loved ones, it must 
be because not to allow capital punishment at all due to the 
inevitability of mistakes would condemn even more innocent people to 
death by murders that could be deterred through the use of capital 
punishment.  As Sunstein and Vermeule put it: “a legal regime with 
capital punishment predictably produces far fewer arbitrary and 
irreversible deaths than a regime without capital punishment.” Id., at 
731.  That depends on the adequacy of the process of determining guilt 
and the frequency of mistakes.  Sunstein and Vermeule argue that the 
evidence shows there to be substantial accuracy in inflicting capital 
punishment. Id., at 736 and note 93.  On the other hand, many 
commentators have argued that procedural safeguards in capital cases are 
grossly inadequate.  See,  e.g., James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of 
Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030 (2000)(discussing the political incentives 
of the capital punishment system to convict and the many serious errors 
resulting from the inadequacy of the process – e.g., inadequate 
representation of and resources available to capital defendants, 
prosecutorial misconduct such as suppressing evidence favorable to 
defendants, and overreliance on an overtaxed appeals process to correct 
mistakes – and advocating a more conscientious effort to assure fair 
trials in capital cases); Penny J. White, Errors and Ethics: Dilemmas in 
Death, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1265 (2001)(discussing evidence of frequent 
errors in capital cases and recommending solutions).  Personally, in 
light of the racial and class bias that infects the capital-punishment 
15
Therefore, Sunstein and Vermeule assume that murderers 
are morally blameworthy.  In this society that assumption 
underlies criminal law in general and death penalty 
jurisprudence in particular.18 Many criminal law doctrines 
that excuse or mitigate the sanction for actions that would 
otherwise be punishable or punished more severely – e.g., 
the defenses of insanity, self-defense, or duress – have 
their roots in concerns over whether someone ought to be 
deemed blameworthy under those circumstances.19 
system and the society at large, see infra Part C, I seriously doubt 
that its inadequacies can be fixed.  Compare Kenneth Williams, The Death 
Penalty: Can It Be Fixed? 51 CATH. L. REV. 1177 (2002)(arguing that, 
except for war criminals and mass murderers, the death penalty should be 
abolished because of the incurable racism that infects the system).  If 
not, then substantially increasing capital punishment is likely to 
substantially increase the incidence of innocent executions, possibly to 
the point of overwhelming any deterrent impact capital punishment may 
have.      
18 See, e,g., Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal 
Justice and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1383 
(2003); Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the 
Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 329-32 (1985); Stephen 
J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 Geo. L.J. 527 (1996).  
19 Re insanity, see infra note 34.  Re self-defense, see, e.g. Shlomit 
Wallerstein, Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of Forced 
Consequences, 91 VA. L. REV. 999, 999-1000, 1027 (2005)(rejecting 
traditional theories of self-defense based on a “lesser harmful results” 
approach where “the aggressor alone is responsible for the situation and 
hence the weight of his interests ought to be diminished,” or a “forced 
choice” approach where the defender’s act is excused because he “lacks 
real choice, and so his act is not fully voluntary” or is justified 
because “the aggressor, as the one who forces the defender to choose 
between his own life and the life of the aggressor, ought to be the one 
who pays the price”; and advocating “a theory of forced consequences” 
based on “the unjust threat posed by the aggressor.”  Re duress, see, 
e.g., John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L. REV.
275, 277-78 (1999)(rejecting the “traditional Aristotelian” view of the 
defense of duress as based on the involuntary and “essentially unfree” 
nature of the act, as well as “moralized” theories that justify certain 
voluntary acts on the basis of “contextualized normative judgments”; and 
advocating a “utilitarian model” that excuses certain coerced acts due 
to their “undeterrability”). 
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Yet at times Sunstein and Vermeule seem ambivalent 
about blameworthiness.  Thus with regard to juvenile and 
mentally-impaired murderers they say that “no a priori 
argument either precludes or mandates extending capital 
punishment to all such cases.”20 And if there is sufficient 
evidence that executing 15-year-old murderers (or, we must 
also assume, murderers of any age) would significantly deter 
murder, then “[i]n our view, there is a strong argument that 
states would then be morally obligated to extend capital 
punishment to such cases.”21 
That certainly follows from a consequentialist 
perspective.  What is not clear is whether they view such 
murderers as blameworthy, in contrast to the innocent people 
it would be “worse than outrageous” to execute on 
consequentialist grounds.  That the issue is controversial 
is evidenced by the insanity defense as well as the Supreme 
Court’s banning of the execution of the insane, the mentally 
retarded and juveniles as cruel and unusual punishment, all 
of which derive from a perceived (albeit debatable) lack of 
blameworthiness.22 
Note, however, that the existence of the insanity 
defense, and banning the execution of the mentally impaired 
 
20 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 746.  
21 Id. 
22 See supra note 13. 
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and of juveniles, might well detract from the deterrent 
impact of the death penalty.  If capital punishment deters 
murder, it must be because potential murderers are aware of 
the possibility.  But if they are also aware of the 
possibility of escaping execution through an insanity 
defense or because of their mental incapacity or age, then 
some might be willing to proceed; whereas, they might not 
under a “you do the crime, you do the time” approach.23 
Therefore, unless executing mentally-impaired or 
juvenile murderers is morally objectionable for other 
reasons, Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s consequentialist analysis 
suggests that it may be morally obligatory to execute them 
in the face of evidence of its deterrent effect.  In fact, 
however, there is little such evidence.  None of the studies 
purporting to show the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment controlled for the age or mental state of the 
offender, and one cannot assume that juveniles and the 
mentally impaired will respond to capital punishment in the 
 
23 In banning the execution of the mentally retarded in Atkins, supra 
note 13, at 320, and of juveniles under 18 in Roper, supra note 13, at 
1196, in addition to the moral objections the Supreme Court raised to 
their execution per diminished culpability, it also questioned whether 
they are susceptible to deterrence due to their impairments and 
immaturity.  In both instances the Court was speculating, as Sunstein 
and Vermeule note with regard to Roper, Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 
3, at 705 and footnote 8, and it could be that executing them deters 
murders by other juveniles and mentally-impaired persons.  But that is 
not a sufficient reason for executing them, if there are moral 
objections to doing so.  Beating a three year old child might well be an 
effective way to control her behavior, but that does not make it right. 
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same way as “normal” adults.24 Therefore, the only way to 
tell whether executing juveniles and the mentally impaired 
deters murder is to change the law and experiment on them.25 
Although a consequentialist approach to the problem 
would seem to recommend such experimentation, at times 
Sunstein and Vermeule seem uncomfortable with that, stemming 
 
24 Between 1976 and 1993, the homicide offending rate for those between 
14-17 years of age almost tripled from 11.4 to 31.3 per 100,000 
population.  Between 1993 and 2002, the rate declined rapidly to 9.0, 
somewhat less than the 1976 rate.  During that period the overall 
homicide rate, which between the early 1970s and mid 1990s was roughly 
twice what it had been in the prior 20 years, declined for all age 
groups but by far the most for those between 14-17.  Fox & Zawitz, supra 
note 5.  What accounts for this decline?  Following the Supreme Court’s 
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976 after a four year moratorium, 
executions, of which there were a total of only 885 between 1977 and 
2003, began to rise in the mid-1980s from 21 in 1984 to a peak of 98 in 
1999 followed by a drop to 65 in 2003.  Bonczar & Snell, supra note 5, 
at 10.  Conceivably, the decline in the murder rate is attributable to 
the resumption of and increase in executions.  But the decline was 
greatest among those under 18, who were the least likely to be executed.  
Why so?  Conceivably because of the fear that the death penalty might be 
practiced more frequently against them as well.  But then in that case 
it might not be necessary to execute them in order to deter murder, so 
long at least as the possibility of execution remains open; unless, on 
the other hand, the failure to extend the death penalty to them over a 
period of time dissipates the fear.  If so, now that the Supreme Court 
has banned the execution of juveniles, one might expect the juvenile 
murder rate to rise again.  If it doesn’t, then one may have to conclude 
that something other than a resumption of capital punishment produced 
the recent decline in the juvenile murder rate, thereby undermining the 
deterrence hypothesis.  If it does, then the only way to tell whether 
executing juveniles deters murder will be to change the law and begin 
executing them in sufficient numbers to study the impact. 
25 That is certainly true with regard to juveniles.  Only 22 juveniles 
under 18, 13 of whom were in Texas, were executed between 1976 and the 
Supreme Court’s banning of their execution in 2005.  Death Penalty 
Information Center at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
article.php?scid=27&did=203#execsus. That clearly seems an insufficient 
sample to study the deterrent impact of executing them.  I don’t know 
what data is available with regard to the mentally impaired who were 
executed prior to the bans on executing the insane in 1986 and the 
mentally retarded in 2002.  In any event, accurately evaluating the 
deterrent impact of executing the mentally impaired on other mentally 
impaired people would seem quite hard to do, since the size of the 
target group (other mentally impaired people) on which the extent of the 
deterrence depends is highly uncertain.       
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seemingly from concerns over blameworthiness.  Thus, one of 
their arguments against executing the innocent or using 
torture in order to deter murder is as follows: 
[I]t is not clear how policymakers could have reliable 
evidence about the deterrent effects of conviction of 
the innocent, torture or other disturbing practices 
without first experimenting on hapless victims; and the 
necessary experimentation might well be impermissible on 
moral grounds ex ante, even if the policies themselves 
would be permissible given certain experimental findings 
ex post. Capital punishment, however, is already the 
status quo in most states, and policymakers already have 
many decades’ worth of reliable data about its deterrent 
effects.26 
But not much, if any, reliable data with regard to juveniles 
and the mentally impaired.  Would experimenting on them in 
order to gather the data make them “hapless victims”, 
especially if it should turn out that executing them has no 
deterrent effect?  The fact that they did the deed is not 
enough to answer no, because that begs the very question at 
issue of whether juveniles and the mentally impaired are 
sufficiently blameworthy for the murders they commit to 
justify executing them.  If not, then executing them is a
type of victimization. 
In objecting to the execution of innocent people and 
other disturbing practices, Sunstein and Vermeule show that 
they are not pure consequentialists.  Consequently, I don’t 
think they can complete their case for the sometimes moral 
 
26 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 737.  
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obligation of society to practice capital punishment without 
more fully addressing non-consequential objections to 
capital punishment as applied not only to the mentally 
impaired and juveniles but also in general.  If it is 
immoral to execute blameless people to deter murder, and if 
at least some murderers are not morally blameworthy or for 
some reason have diminished blameworthiness, then how could 
society be morally obligated to execute them? 
Let’s begin by asking, in light of the fact that 
society routinely and unavoidably makes life-life trade-offs 
involving innocent people, why the issue of blameworthiness 
is thought relevant at all to capital punishment.  Many 
things society does or chooses not to do risk life and cause 
premature death to some innocent and blameless people.  When 
that is so, the argument that society should act so as to 
maximize life unless there is good reason not to seems 
strong.  Everything else being equal, not to prefer more 
over less life would contravene the high value that all 
moral philosophies place on human life. 
 The value of human life, though, entails more than mere 
longevity, and at times the quality of life may enter the 
equation.  For example, just as a terminally ill person 
might choose to die rather than prolong a life of pain, so a 
society might decide to limit the resources it expends to 
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keep terminally ill people alive and to devote them instead 
to improving the society’s overall well-being in other ways 
that may or may not involve life-life trade-offs.27 So long 
as that decision is made pursuant to a fair process, meaning 
one in which all affected parties can fairly participate and 
which fairly accounts for their interests, it would not seem 
morally objectionable.  Such a decision would seem 
permissible, for instance, in a society conforming to 
Rawlsian principles of justice, under which there is no 
absolute right to life but only the right to have one’s life 
treated as of comparable value to everyone else’s life 
through a fair decision-making process.28 
So if there are situations when morality permits, and 
perhaps requires, the sacrifice of innocent lives for the 
benefit of the whole, why not with regard to capital 
punishment if it could be shown that executing innocent or 
otherwise blameless people would on balance save lives?  If 
it is permissible at times to withhold treatment from a 
terminally ill person or even to practice euthanasia,29 or 
 
27 See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS & LAMES E. SABIN, SETTING LIMITS FAIRLY: CAN WE LEARN 
TO SHARE MEDICAL RESOURCES? (2003)(on the importance of developing a fair 
and democratic process for making decisions regarding the allocation of 
resources for medical treatment in light of the inevitability of having 
to prioritize the uses of scarce resources and the unresolvable ethical 
debates over their proper allocation).  
28 See RAWLS, supra note 10, at 221-43 (discussing political justice and 
the rule of law). 
29 See, e.g., JOHN KEOWN, ED., EUTHANASIA EXAMINED (1995)(essays from a 
variety of perspectives on various types of euthanasia, from the 
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in a hostage-taking situation to kill some innocents in 
order to save yet more,30 then why not to execute the 
mentally impaired or juveniles if in fact that would 
contribute to deterring murder?   
 It seems to me that there is no logically correct way 
to resolve these questions, and that ultimately a value 
judgment is required in terms of what are deemed relevant 
moral considerations.  The terminally ill analogy might be 
distinguished from executing the mentally impaired or 
juveniles on the ground that the terminally ill person has 
little time to live in any event and is suffering great 
pain, such that allowing the person to die or ending her 
life is thought more humane than keeping her alive.  And the 
hostage-taking situation might be distinguished on the 
ground that there is no viable alternative,31 whereas there 
are other potentially effective ways of deterring murder 
that should be exhausted before resorting to the execution 
of those society deems blameless.      
 
withholding of life-saving treatment to active mercy killing of the 
terminally ill, and whether with or without the request of the party). 
30 See infra note 31. 
31 For example, although it may not have been a classic hostage-taking 
situation, the principle criticism of the government’s assault on the 
Branch Dividians at Waco, in which numerous people including children 
were killed, has been that there was still time to negotiate a solution.  
See, e.g., DAVID B. KOPEL & PAUL H. BLACKMAN, NO MORE WACOS: WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND HOW TO FIX IT (1997) JAMES R. LEWIS, ED., FROM THE 
ASHES: MAKING SENSE OF WACO (1994); DICK J. REAVIS, THE ASHES OF WACO: AN
INVESTIGATION (1995). 
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 But suppose it turns out that executing the mentally 
impaired or juveniles really would deter certain types of 
murder far more effectively than other measures; for 
example, murders by other mentally impaired people and 
juveniles who might be more likely to kill in the absence of 
the possibility of facing execution.  Then on pure 
consequentialist grounds executing them would be permissible 
or per Sunstein and Vermeule even obligatory.  If that seems 
objectionable it must be – and this is the crux of the moral 
debate – that for some reason it would be inhumane to 
execute them even for the overall benefit of society, which 
is simply another way of saying that they are not 
sufficiently blameworthy for the murders they commit to 
warrant executing them.   
This is an example of a familiar objection to 
utilitarianism as a philosophy, namely, that it allows 
individuals to be used for society’s benefit in ways that 
violate human dignity.32 For example, if human dignity 
 
32 See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Utilitarianism and Aiding Others, in WILLIAMS 
& MILLER, supra note 7, at 225, 239 (arguing that utilitarianism would 
justify forced organ donation at the cost of the donor’s life in order 
to save two other persons’ lives, and that the example shows 
utilitarianism’s insufficient sensitivity to the rights of individuals 
and its preparedness to use people “in whatever way will maximize 
overall utility”).  Compare Harsanyi, supra note 7, at 59-60 (rejecting 
the moral monstrosity claim by excluding anti-social preferences and 
employing a rule-utilitarian approach that recognizes “the importance of 
social institutions which establish a network of moral rights and of 
moral obligations... that... must not be infringed upon on grounds of 
immediate social utility”).  Harsanyi’s move is tantamount to 
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entails the right to be free, and if people operating behind 
a veil of ignorance would not under any conditions agree to 
subject themselves to slavery, then to an adherent of a 
Rawlsian theory of justice slavery is morally wrong even if 
it does benefit society as a whole.33 In short, in the 
interest of protecting individual rights justice may require 
at times that society forego that which benefits society as 
a whole.  Before proceeding to execute the mentally impaired 
or juveniles, or anyone for that matter, fairness requires a 
fair assessment of such moral considerations.                           
Blameworthiness, as noted, is central to the 
jurisprudence of criminal law.  And the determination of 
blameworthiness depends on moral considerations that at 
times may trump a consequentialist or utilitarian 
calculation of society’s overall welfare.  The two 
considerations I want to address here are the state of mind 
of mentally-impaired and juvenile murderers and society’s 
contribution to those murders.   
A principal argument that has been advanced against 
executing the mentally impaired and juveniles below a 
certain age is that they lack the mental capacity to be 
 
incorporating into the utilitarian decision-making process moral 
constraints that trump what a social utility analysis would otherwise 
require, and akin to Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s reluctance to support 
executing the innocent in order to save yet more innocent lives.      
33 RAWLS, supra note 10, at 158-9, 248. 
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deemed deserving of punishment or at least of execution.34 
The concern over mental capacity ultimately derives from a 
commitment to the notion that human beings have free will, 
meaning the capacity to make reasoned and rational choices, 
and from the moral sentiment that executing people when that 
capacity is lacking or highly impaired would violate human 
dignity in much the same way as executing the innocent.    
Whether humans actually have the capacity to make free 
willed choices, or whether their sense of having free will 
is an illusion and their choices are really determined 
responses to biological and environmental stimuli, is a 
long-standing debate that is probably unresolvable as a 
scientific matter.  For example, the fact that different 
people respond differently in similar situations, or that 
particular people respond differently to similar situations 
 
34 See supra note 13.  As debates over what constitutes legal insanity 
show, what mental capacity is required to hold someone blameworthy is 
controversial.  The dominant approach in this society is that a person 
must be incapable of understanding the difference between right and 
wrong in order to avoid punishment on grounds of insanity.  Under the 
minority approach followed in many jurisdictions the insanity defense is 
also available to people who understand the difference between right and 
wrong but who as a result of mental disease or defect lack the capacity 
to conform their behavior thereto.  The assumption underlying both 
approaches is that absent a sufficient mental capacity blameworthiness 
shouldn’t attach, with the dispute being how incapacitated a person must 
be in order to escape blame.  On the insanity defense generally, see, 
e.g., ABRAHAM GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); ROBERT F. SCHOOP,
AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
INQUIRY (1991); Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An 
Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of 
Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371 (1986); Christopher Slobogin, An End to 
Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1199 (2000).   
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over time, could be seen as evidence of free-willed choice 
or of nuances in the stimuli that produce determined 
responses.  Consequently, society’s only option is to 
address the matter through the moral philosophies it adopts, 
whether those philosophies themselves are a product of free 
choice or are determined.35 
My take on the matter is dialectical and pragmatic.  
Dialectically speaking, human action is a process in which 
free will and determinism are internally related to each 
other, meaning that people’s choices are free-willed and 
determined at the same time; meaning that people’s choices 
are in response to and are highly conditioned though not 
totally controlled by circumstance, and whether the free-
willed or deterministic component of action is more 
prominent or significant depends on the context.36 Thus an 
 
35 See, e.g., DANIEL N. ROBINSON, PRAISE AND BLAME  (2000)(noting the 
centrality of the free will versus determinism conundrum to the issue of 
blameworthiness, and attempting to transcend the dilemma through a form 
of “moral realism” which asserts the existence of objective moral truths 
that are knowable through intuition and reason and that warrant praise 
or blame on the basis of “introspectively known powers of action and 
restraint... subject to projection onto creatures of the same or similar 
type,” at 47); EUGENE SCHLOSSBERGER, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PERSONS 6
(1992)(“[W]e are morally evaluable for those properties we instantiate 
that show something about us as moral agents, that reveal, reflect, or 
express our attitudes, beliefs, values, and so on.  A person is 
blameworthy insofar as the moral stance reflected in those moral beliefs 
and values is incorrect... Autonomy, freedom, and the ability to do 
otherwise are not prerequisites for moral responsibility.”) 
36 See BERTELL OLLMAN, DANCE OF THE DIALECTIC 27 (2003)(“There are not some 
elements that are related to the factor or event in question as 
‘causes’... and others as ‘conditions’... Instead we find as internally 
related parts of whatever is said to be the cause or determining agent 
everything that is said to be a condition, and vice-versa.”).  A similar 
27
unemployed and starving person would more likely opt to take 
the risks associated with stealing food than someone with a 
job and a full belly.  But since the starving person could 
choose to starve to death rather than steal to survive, a 
moral judgment must be made as to whether it is just to 
punish him under those circumstances.    
Pragmatically speaking, since it is impossible to tell 
whether free will or determinism drives action, then both 
are viable explanations and which explanation is adopted in 
given instances only matters when the practical consequences 
differ.37 Thus punishing or excusing the starving thief can 
be justified under either explanation depending again on 
one’s moral philosophy.  From a pure consequentialist 
perspective, whether the thief or anybody else has free will 
or not is irrelevant since punishing the thief may deter 
thievery generally in either case, whether because people 
freely choose or are simply conditioned to desist from crime 
in order to avoid punishment.  The only question is whether 
 
approach seems implicit in some theories of criminal law.  Compare, 
e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1997)(on 
the capacity or lack thereof to reason rationally in particular contexts 
as a way to reconcile the free-will/determinism conundrum); Morse, supra 
note 15 (on the ability or lack thereof to exercise self-control in 
context as a way to reconcile the free-will/determinism conundrum). 
37 See WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM (1907)(from Lecture Two: What Pragmatism 
Means: “The pragmatic method is a method of settling metaphysical 
disputes that otherwise might be interminable... The pragmatic method in 
such cases is to try to interpret each action by tracing its respective 
practical consequences... If no practical differences whatever can be 
traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all 
dispute is idle.”)  
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society as a whole is deemed better off in punishing that 
type of theft.  From a retributive perspective, since it 
presumes free will, if we say in light of an instinct to 
survive that the starving thief lacks or has diminished free 
will, then punishment might be thought unwarranted or at 
least appropriately mitigated.  If, on the other hand, we 
say the person has free will, then whether to punish him 
requires a moral judgment balancing his interest in 
remaining alive as against other people’s property 
interests.38 
So would it be inhumane to execute the mentally 
impaired and juveniles, or are they sufficiently blameworthy 
for the murders they commit to warrant executing them?  If 
executing them seems objectionable, it is not because they 
totally lack free will or are unresponsive to conditioning.  
Except in the case of severely delusional people or infants, 
that is probably not the case; and if executing the mentally 
impaired and juveniles actually deterred murder the proof 
would be in the pudding.   
 
38 Compare Jeremy Waldron, Why Indigence Is Not a Justification, in 
WILLIAM C. HEFFERNAN & JOHN KLEINIG, EDS., FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 98, 99 (2000)(opining, while 
noting the philosophical argument for indigence as a justification for 
criminal acts, that such a defense is unlikely to be recognized since 
that “would call into question the legitimacy of the general rules of 
property in a society”). 
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In the final analysis, therefore, society’s moral 
judgment about when people lack the mental capacity to be 
held criminally responsible for their acts or deserving of 
execution entails unavoidably debatable line drawing.  
Mental competency is a question of degree.  There is no 
clear-cut line on one side of which people are clearly 
mentally competent and on the other side clearly not.  And 
there is ample room for disagreement among people’s moral 
sensibilities about the matter, as reflected for example in 
debates over what the legal standard of insanity ought to be 
and what the age limit ought to be for executing someone.39 
Scientific analysis can help decide by shedding light 
on how people’s mental processes actually function, although 
there will often be disputes over the meaning and validity 
of scientific findings and as in other areas where science 
and law intersect a value judgment will ultimately be 
required.40 And judicial wrangling over the 
 
39 See supra note 34, re the legal standard of insanity.  See the debate 
between the majority and dissent opinions in Roper, supra note 13, re 
the appropriate age limit for execution.    
40 See, e.g., Maureen L. Condic & Samuel B. Condic, The Appropriate 
Limits of Science in the Formation of Public Policy, 17 NOTRE DAME J. LAW 
ETHICS & PUB. POL. 157, 161-62 (2003)(“When it comes to morals, the key 
insight to remember is that scientific research is about the possible, 
not about the ethical or the good.  As such, scientific evidence can 
inform society whether something can, at this point in time, be done and 
scientific judgment can predict whether it is probable something will be 
done in the future, but science is inherently silent on the topic of 
whether it should be done...  In matters both practical and moral, it is 
nearly impossible to navigate the arcane world of the newly possible 
without some input from scientists themselves.  Rationally considering 
the direction public policy will take to best serve the interests of a 
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constitutionality of the death penalty may help by 
contributing to society’s understanding of the moral issues, 
although in the long run the political process is likely to 
control the outcome.41 Consequently, the moral legitimacy 
of society’s decision of whether to practice capital 
punishment and against whom depends on the justness of the 
decision-making process.  If that process is unfairly biased 
in one way or another, then the decisions emanating from it 
are morally illegitimate. 
Unfair biases might consist of procedural defects such 
as a political process structured in favor of or against a 
particular group or class, or of social injustices that 
impede people’s opportunity to participate equitably in 
decision-making or are themselves to blame for causing 
crime.  Without question this society (and many others) have 
historically been biased against the mentally impaired,42 
free and democratic society requires an assessment of what is, in fact, 
possible now, what will be (to the best of our knowledge) likely in the 
future and what risks are associated with this possibility.  Such an 
assessment can only be made by relying on the testimony of scientific 
experts.”).   
41 See, e.g., GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (1991)(arguing that courts are highly limited in their ability to 
bring about meaningful social change due to a lack of sufficient 
independence from other branches of government on whose support they 
depend to implement their rulings, and that courts are most effective 
when they follow rather than lead political reform). 
42 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ARRIGO, THE COUNTOURS OF PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE 97-104, 130-
35 (1996)(surveying the evolution of psychiatric institutions in the 
United States from the colonial period characterized as “often gruesome 
and brutal”; to the first half of the 19th cenury when despite a small 
scale “moral treatment movement” based on “principles of decency and 
respect” most mentally disordered people remained untreated; to the 
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and whether it is adequately and fairly responding to their 
needs for appropriate treatment today seems highly 
doubtful.43 Juveniles below a certain age are excluded from 
the political process, and the assumption that parents and 
other adults will adequately account for their interests may 
not always be warranted.  That school-age children murder by 
the tens of thousands is a sign that this society has 
grossly failed to respond to their needs for appropriate 
rearing.44 
Under these conditions I would say that society is not 
sufficiently just toward the mentally impaired or juveniles 
 
latter half of the 19th century when the moral reform movement 
dissipated and which witnessed institutionalization in large-scale 
psychiatric facilities where the mentally disordereds’ experiences “were 
comparable to their experiences in colonial America”; to the first half 
of the 20th century characterized, despite a more humane mental hygiene 
movement that benefited a few, by a burgeoning institutionalization of 
the mentally disabled in state hospitals that functioned as “holding 
tanks”; to the latter 20th century which gave rise to a 
deinstitutionalization movement emphasizing outpatient treatment and 
maintenance-based strategies, but which has been characterized by acute 
housing problems and ineffective support services leading to a revolving 
door pattern of periodic crises, commitment and release, and by the 
increased incarceration of the mentally disabled in facilities which 
lack professional and supportive care and where they are frequently 
victimized).      
43 Id. at 3, 13, 103 (characterizing the history and present-day legacy 
of the treatment of the mentally disabled, despite periodic reform 
movements, as “the politics of abandonment” and as based on “an implicit 
and negative assumption about individuals who act differently from what 
we determine to be acceptable or normal behavior”; and concluding that 
“the failure of existing mental health law to adequately provide for the 
needs of disordered citizens is immense”).  
44 Almost 67,000 juveniles under 18 committed murder between 1976-2002, 
supra note 15.  On the society’s failure to respond to children’s needs, 
see, e.g., ROBERT V. HECKEL & DAVID M. SHUMAKER, CHILDREN WHO MURDER: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (2001)(identifying declining support systems for 
young children per changes in family structure, lack of community 
services, unresponsive schools and juvenile justice system as 
contributing factors).   
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as to justify executing them.  This is not to relieve them 
of responsibility for their anti-social acts, but to limit 
how society may in justice respond to anti-social acts for 
which it too bears responsibility.  Society may and is 
indeed obligated to limit the freedom of those whose conduct 
shows they are likely to murder innocent people.  But there 
is something perverse about society’s executing them for 
crimes resulting from its dereliction of duty towards them.  
More consistent with human dignity, when society is itself 
at least partially to blame for murders committed by 
juveniles and the mentally impaired, is for it to do what it 
can to respond fairly to their needs so as to minimize their 
anti-social behavior, to attempt through rehabilitation to 
undo the harm it has done to those who commit crimes as a 
by-product of society’s failings so that they can resume 
normal lives, and to treat humanely those who must remain 
confined because they have become irretrievably 
incorrigible.  
C.  Social Injustice as a Cause of Murder – Executing the   
 Disadvantaged and Oppressed 
 
One countervailing consideration relating to capital 
punishment that Sunstein and Vermeule do consider is the 
question of whether sanctions for murder less drastic than 
execution, for example life imprisonment, might better deter 
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murder.45 If so, then given the goal of preventing the 
murder of innocent people, their analysis would counsel 
against capital punishment because life imprisonment would 
preserve more life.  However, in light of evidence of the 
apparent deterrent impact of capital punishment, they find 
this common objection to capital punishment unavailing.46 
There are, however, other means of deterring murder that 
Sunstein and Vermeule either give short shrift to or do not 
address at all, and whose availability is I believe fatal to 
their case for capital punishment. 
Conspicuously absent from Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s 
argument is a contextual analysis of why the murder rate is 
so high in the United States as compared with other 
developed countries that do not practice capital 
punishment.47 Suppose one concludes, as seems most likely, 
that the explanation lies in the differing histories, 
cultures and circumstances of those societies.  And suppose 
one concludes, as would I, that the high murder rate here is 
largely attributable to injustices in the structure and 
operation of the society.  For example, it seems to me a 
 
45 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 732-34.  
46 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 732-33.  
47 Between 1999-2001 the homicide rate in the United States was 3.5 
times that in the European Union.  Gordon Barclay & Cynthia Tavares, 
International comparisons of criminal justice statistics, 2001 at 3 at 
http://www.csdp.org/research/hosb1203pdf. During the 1990s it was 3 
times that of Canada.  At http://www.answers.com/topic/crime-in-canada.
None of these countries practice capital punishment.  At 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/capital_punishment.   
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strong case could be made that the United States does not 
now conform to Rawls’ second principle of justice, the 
difference principle, in that neither the requirement of 
fair equality of opportunity nor of the organization of 
society such that its social and economic inequalities 
benefit the least advantaged are satisfied.48 While it may 
be difficult to conclusively prove a link between those 
injustices and murder – in the same way that factual 
uncertainties complicate most any public issue - the fact 
that the murder rate is so much higher among the 
disadvantaged lends credence to such a conclusion.49 
If that conclusion is correct, then it follows that but 
for social injustice there would be less murder.  Indeed, I 
am convinced that in a truly just society murder would be 
very uncommon.  If so, then one way to deter murder would be 
to reform society.  Admittedly, that may be a complex 
process that requires time to complete.  But so would be 
gathering and analyzing the (never conclusive) data to 
 
48 RAWLS, supra note 10, at 75-83. 
49 See infra, note 63.  For example, among those on death row at the end 
of 2003, almost all of whom were male, 52% had not graduated high school 
at the time of their arrest, 38% had a high school degree, and only 9% 
had attended college.  Bonczar & Snell, supra note 5, at Table 5.  As of 
2000, by way of comparison, among the country’s male population 25 and 
older (representing 60% of those on death row at the time of their 
arrest) 20% had not graduated high school, 28% had a high school degree, 
and 52% had attended college.  Among the country’s male population 18-24 
(representing 38% on death row), 29% had not graduated high school, 30% 
had a high school degree, and 41% had attended college.  U.S. Census 
Bureau, Educational Attainment at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ 
SAFFPeople?_sse=on.
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establish the deterrent impact of capital punishment, 
designing a fair process for implementing it,50 and then 
waiting for the deterrent impact to take effect.  And all 
the time, energy and money spent on that process could be 
devoted instead to reforming society, thereby speeding up 
the impact that process would have in reducing murder. 
 Now suppose one believes that this society is morally 
obligated to comply with Rawls’ theory of justice, and even 
that Rawls’ principles of justice are implicit in the 
society’s foundational moral principles as set forth in the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.51 If it 
is reasonable to think that reforming society in accordance 
with those principles would greatly reduce or eliminate 
murder, then to opt instead for capital punishment might 
well in the long run produce more innocent deaths than 
reforming society.  If so, then the moral choice, even 
 
50 See supra note 17, on the importance of and difficulties in designing 
and implementing a fair process for capital punishment. 
51 Compare Linda M. Keller, The American Rejection of Economic Rights as 
Human Rights and the Declaration of Independence: Does the Pursuit of 
Happiness Require Basic Economic Rights, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 557, 
560 (2003)(arguing that the government has “the duty to facilitate the 
pursuit of happiness by providing minimum economic means,” including 
basic economic rights now widely accepted in the international community 
to such things as food, shelter, education, employment and health care); 
CASS M. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS (2004)(arguing that Franklin 
Roosevelt’s so-called Second Bill of Rights, including the right to 
education, a job, a decent home and adequate health care, merits the 
status of the Declaration of Independence as a statement of society’s 
most fundamental principles). 
36
pursuant to Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s consequentionalist 
approach, must be to opt for societal reform. 
 Sunstein and Vermeule do mention societal reform as an 
alternative to capital punishment: 
Switching to a Swedish-style welfare state might (or 
might not) reduce crime dramatically, but we will never 
know because we will never try it.  So too, increasing 
job-training funds by several orders of magnitude might 
result in many fewer murders, but such policies are 
simply not in the cards.  Capital punishment, by 
contrast, is very much a live policy option...52 
This acknowledges the possibility that societal reform 
might reduce murder more than capital punishment might deter 
it.  But it treats societal reform and capital punishment as 
if they are otherwise equal policy choices, such that the 
only task is to decide which is more politically doable.  
Yet if society’s injustices have caused murder, and if 
society can dramatically reduce murder by rectifying those 
injustices, then that is the choice it is morally obligated 
to make.  To opt for capital punishment under those 
circumstances is an immoral choice because it would leave in 
place the murders of innocent people that are caused by 
social injustice and that capital punishment does not deter, 
and would lead to the execution of people who would not have 
committed murder had society instead reformed itself.  
 
52 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 733.  
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Political infeasibility is not a valid excuse for failing to 
do that which morality requires.   
Sunstein and Vermeule suggest a possible response to 
this argument: “(A) plausible inference is that whatever 
steps states take to reduce homicide, capital punishment 
will provide further deterrence.”53 In other words, 
conceding that society is obligated to rectify its 
injustices, the argument might be that so long as it 
proceeds to do so it should also practice capital punishment 
so as to further deter murder, at least until societal 
reform reduces murder to a level that capital punishment is 
no longer needed as a deterrent.  In fact, Sunstein and 
Vermeule seem to believe that point will never be reached: 
“Whatever states do, some level of homicide is 
inevitable.”54 So even in a fully just society, they seem 
to feel that capital punishment will be needed as a 
deterrent and therefore be morally obligatory. 
There are several objections to this line of argument.  
First, since resources are always limited, practicing 
capital punishment will divert resources that could be 
devoted to societal reform, and thus may slow down the speed 
 
53 Id., at 732.  
54 Id.
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at which societal reform could occur if society had the will 
power to do what justice requires.     
Second, as a practical matter, society’s use of capital 
punishment may deter more aggressive efforts to reform 
society by distracting attention from societal injustices 
and focusing instead on what might seem a quicker fix to the  
problem.  Sunstein and Vermeule acknowledge this 
possibility, but then discount it:   
(P)erhaps capital punishment reduces the political 
incentive to adopt other strategies, and if this were 
so, the argument for capital punishment would surely be 
weakened.  But there is little reason to believe that 
if capital punishment were abolished, there would be 
significantly larger efforts to reduce violent crime 
through education and training programs.55 
Perhaps not, but society’s unwillingness to do what justice 
requires cannot justify doing instead what justice condemns.  
Moreover, I think it can strongly be argued, and indeed is 
likely, that the emphasis in the current era on personal 
responsibility as the solution to social ills (as, for 
example, with welfare reform) has in fact diverted attention 
from society’s contribution to those ills.56 And continuing 
 
55 Id., at 733.  
56 Compare Dripps, supra note 18, at 390 (discussing the psychological 
tendency in this society to “overassess individual responsibility and 
underassess situational factors” in assessing blameworthiness); Susan L. 
Thomas, ‘Ending Welfare as We Know It,’ or Farewell to the Rights of 
Women on Welfare? A Constitutional and Human Rights Analysis of the 
Personal Responsibility Act, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 179, 202 
(2001)(arguing that the Act violates women’s human rights and advocating 
“a welfare law that enhances rather than diminishes the citizenship of 
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down that path yet further may only solidify the focus on 
personal responsibility and make efforts to reform society 
even less likely.    
 Third, even acknowledging the likelihood of some amount 
of murder in the just society, it is not necessarily the 
case that capital punishment would operate as a deterrent in 
that context.  Perhaps below some level of execution capital 
punishment ceases to work as a deterrence.57 Perhaps the 
murders that occur in a just society are of a type that 
capital punishment cannot deter.  Once there, if it turns 
out that capital punishment will deter the still residual 
murder rate, then there is a consequentialist case for it.  
But until we get there, society’s moral obligation is to do 
all it can to reform itself as quickly as possible. 
 A possible objection to this line of reasoning is that 
it extends far beyond the field of capital punishment to 
many other areas of social life, and that if followed it 
would lead to ridiculous results.  For example, if capital 
punishment is immoral when society’s injustices cause 
 
all single mothers in poverty who need governmental assistance to 
survive”). 
57 In fact, two of the recent studies have found that low levels of 
execution actually have the brutalizing effect of increasing the murder 
rate.  Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, supra note 1; Shepherd, Deterrence versus 
Brutalization, supra note 1.  The import of these findings is that 
states choosing to practice capital punishment must be prepared to 
execute larger enough numbers of people to make deterrence work, and 
that continuing to execute people after the murder rate has been lowered 
below a certain level either through the deterrent impact of capital 
punishment or societal reform would be self-defeating. 
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murder, could not the same be said of the criminal justice 
system as a whole in light of the plausible argument that 
crime in general, or at least certain types of crime, are a 
by-product of social injustice.  Does this mean that it is 
immoral to imprison people who commit crimes that would not 
occur but for social injustice?58 
For me the answer is that, having wronged both those 
who as a by-product of social injustice commit crimes and 
those who are its victims, society must now respond justly 
to both in a balanced way.  Society is obligated to protect 
the innocent, and toward that end may restrain those who for 
whatever reason are unwilling to refrain from crime.  
Society is also obligated as far as possible to attempt to 
rehabilitate those whose crimes result from social 
injustice, so as to enable them to regain the freedom that 
human dignity demands.  Society may continue to confine 
those who have become irretrievably incorrigible, but in 
light of society’s contribution to the situation must accord 
them humane treatment while confined.  Subject to these 
constraints confinement may be used as an incidental means 
 
58 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the 
Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivations?,
3 LAW & INEQ. 9 (1985)(advocating such a defense); WILLIAM C. HEFFERNAN &
JOHN KLEINIG, supra note 38 (essays pro and con on whether and the extent 
to which poverty does and should excuse or mitigate punishment for 
criminal behavior); Human Rights Coalition, Mission of the HRC at 
www.hrcoalition.com (advocating the dismantling of the prison system in 
favor of “a system of accountability that is truly based in the 
community and focuses on healing, not punishing”). 
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of deterring others from crime, but society’s principal 
means of deterrence must be to begin to practice social 
justice.59 
Above all, having contributed to murder through social 
injustice, society may not compound the problem through 
practicing capital punishment in the name of deterrence.    
Sometimes as a result of their immoral actions people and 
societies put themselves in situations where even acts of  
self-preservation become immoral.  If the United States 
unjustly invades another country and finds its troops 
surrounded by an enemy engaged in justifiable self-defense, 
it is not justifiable to kill innocent people to save its 
troops lives.  Those who commit murder in response to 
society’s having treated them unjustly may not be entirely 
innocent, but for society to execute them after helping 
create the situation is perverse.  
 A second possible objection relates to the distinction 
between individuals and society as a whole.  It is easier to 
justify requiring someone who has wronged another to rectify 
 
59 Compare R. George Wright, The Progressive Logic of Criminal 
Responsibility and the Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 459, 462 (1994)(arguing, as a result of the impact of negative 
environmental conditions that impair the capacities on which moral 
responsibility depends, that “the criminal law systematically punishes 
substantial numbers of the most deprived who... cannot reasonably be 
said to have moral responsibility for their charged conduct”; and, while 
acknowledging the need to confine those who pose a continuing danger to 
others, advocating the creation of the social conditions in which people 
have the opportunity to develop those capacities).     
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that wrong even at the cost of some personal suffering, than 
to justify society’s making innocent people suffer in order 
to correct its past wrongs.  As between two individuals, 
when one of the two must suffer as a consequence of some 
immoral act on the part of one of them, then the argument 
for imposing the suffering on the culpable party is strong.  
But should society in correcting its past wrongs be entitled 
to impose suffering on those alive today who did not 
participate in perpetrating those past wrongs?   
To a great extent the answer depends on one’s 
perspective of society as more individualistic or communal 
in nature and on one’s view of the nature of 
intergenerational rights and responsibilities.  From an 
individualistic perspective, to the extent that those alive 
today benefit from the past wrongs of their antecedents, 
then requiring them to suffer in order to rectify the 
present effects of those wrongs is somewhat analogous to the 
example in the prior paragraph.  As between innocent parties 
who suffer today from society’s past wrongs and other 
otherwise innocent parties who benefit today from those 
wrongs, if one side must suffer then the moral choice would 
seem to be the latter, at least as long as they are left no 
worse off than if those wrongs had not occurred.  While such 
an analysis helps justify (say) affirmative action and 
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reparations,60 it won’t do when in the absence of capital 
punishment innocent people may be murdered, including people 
who themselves suffer from society’s past injustices.   
So suppose society acknowledges that its past 
injustices contribute to murder and is undertaking to reform 
itself.  And suppose it is argued that practicing capital 
punishment along with vigorous societal reform will in the 
long run produce the least net loss of innocent life as a 
result of murder, even if it delays somewhat the achievement 
of a just society.  This seems to me to be the strongest 
case for capital punishment on consequentialist grounds. 
Rawls speaks to this point when he envisions the 
possibility that in some contexts slavery might be justified 
in order to “relieve even worse injustices,” and when it 
constitutes “an advance on established institutions” and “in 
time... will presumably be abandoned altogether.”61 His
example is an agreement among warring city-states to enslave 
 
60 See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks, Getting Reparations for Slavery Right—A 
Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 251 
(2004)(advocating an atonement model of reparations centered on 
restorative justice in which all have a civic duty to participate 
irrespective of personal guilt and especially white Americans who 
benefit from the lingering effects of slavery); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking 
Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action 
and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 686, 694-727 (2004)(advocating a 
corrective justice model of reparations based on the collective 
responsibility of past and present generations to correct the present 
harms of historical racism); Dennis Klimchuck, Unjust Enrichment and 
Reparations for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1257 (2004)(advocating an 
unjust enrichment model of reparations and noting its applicability to 
those who subsequently benefit from prior wrongs).   
61 RAWLS, supra note 10, at 248. 
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rather than kill captives.  On the other hand, since slavery 
violates the fundamental right to liberty, it can never be 
justified for the utilitarian reason that “the greater gains 
to some outweigh the losses to others.”62 Analogously one 
might argue, conceding capital punishment to be unjust in an 
unjust society, that it may nevertheless be practiced in 
order to prevent the worse injustice of allowing preventable 
murders to continue while society is transitioning to a more 
just state of affairs in which murder may be non-existent or 
minimal and capital punishment no longer needed as a 
deterrent.   
I have two qualms with this reasoning, one principled 
and the other pragmatic.  From a principled perspective, 
Rawls does not discuss whether the hypothetical parties are 
involved in a just or unjust war.  To me this is important.  
Suppose one party has unjustly attacked another which is 
justifiably defending itself.  Then I would say that as to 
the attacking party the agreement to enslave rather than 
kill captives is unjust, since its obligation is to stop the 
unjust attack so that no one need be killed or enslaved.  
But if the attacking party is unwilling to desist, then as 
to the defending party the agreement is just because it is 




punishment analogy breaks down, where society’s injustices 
are contributing to murder, because there is no need to 
choose between available evils when society has the 
capacity, if not the will power, to engage in obligatory 
reform.   
From a pragmatic perspective my problem is that the 
transitional argument for capital punishment is too 
speculative, and could be used as a sophisticated way to 
justify capital punishment while undertaking less than 
vigorous societal reform.  That this society is grossly 
unjust and that its injustices are largely responsible for 
the murder rate is, from my vantage point, undeniable.  What 
we don’t know, and can’t until we try, is how fast it is 
possible to reform society and what the impact would be in 
reducing murder.  Moreover, while in the absence of societal 
reform it may be that capital punishment deters murder, it 
does not necessarily follow that it would be an effective 
deterrent if societal reform were vigorously undertaken.  
Perhaps seeing the process of reform would deter people from 
committing murder as or more effectively than capital 
punishment.  If so, then practicing capital punishment would 
be positively immoral on consequentialist grounds.  Since 
the answers to these questions is so uncertain, the morally 
appropriate stance is to oppose capital punishment until 
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vigorous societal reform is undertaken and only then to be 
willing to consider its viability.   
From a communal perspective there are times, as 
Sunstein and Vermeule note, when society has no option but 
to make life-life choices as among innocent parties.  In 
fact, such choices are pervasive in social life and at some 
level impact most everything society does.  Fighting a war 
in order to save innocent lives, for example, will 
inevitably cost innocent lives.  And activities undertaken 
to produce life-sustaining goods will inevitably have side 
effects that cost lives.  How does all this cut with regard 
to capital punishment? 
Foremost, for purposes of this essay, society cannot 
justly make life-life decisions unless its decision-making 
process is just.  In particular, a process that favors those 
who stand to benefit from the decision would be unjust as to 
those to be sacrificed for the common good.  For example, 
drafting the working class to fight wars or locating 
polluting industries in working class areas, while excusing 
society’s elite from those risks, would be unjust if the 
political process that produced those decisions were 
controlled by that very elite.   
As applied to capital punishment, both the victims and 
perpetrators of murder in this society disproportionately 
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come from its disadvantaged classes.63 And it is certainly 
arguable that the political process is tilted in favor of 
monied interests.64 And also arguable, in response to 
public demands to address this society’s high murder rate, 
that the monied elite would prefer capital punishment over 
(say) equalizing educational opportunities by restructuring 
a public-school finance system that greatly favors monied 
interests or over equalizing employment and income 
opportunities through measures that would redistribute 
wealth.65 Indeed, from my perspective what has happened in 
this country over the past generation, in response to a 
burgeoning social reform movement emanating from the civil 
rights and anti-Vietnam War struggles, is that society’s 
elites have promoted fear of crime and punitive approaches 
 
63 See supra, note 49.  See also, Andrew Carsen, Poverty, Crime, and 
Criminal Justice, in HEFFERNAN & KLEINIG, supra note 38, at 25 (discussing 
studies of New York City that find a strong correlation between murder 
rates and areas with high concentrations of poverty, unemployment, lack 
of college education, and single parent families); JAMES F. SHORT, JR., 
POVERTY, ETHNICITY, AND VIOLENT CRIME (1997)(documenting the 
overconcentration of violent crime in high poverty areas and analyzing 
the adverse environmental conditions associated with those areas that 
contribute to crime).    
64 See, e.g., JOSHUA COHEN & JOEL ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1983); STEVE FRASER & GARY GERSTLE, EDS., RULING AMERICA: A
HISTORY OF WEALTH AND POWER IN A DEMOCRACY (2005); KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND 
DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RICH (2002). 
65 See, e.g., PHILIP HARVEY, SECURING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT (1989)(arguing for 
and detailing a feasible program for guaranteeing a right to employment 
for all in the United States, and noting how guaranteed-job proposals 
have historically been thwarted by business interests despite public 
support for it in principle); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION 
FINANCE, EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES (Helen F. 
Ladd, Rosemary Chalk & Janet S. Hansen, eds., 1999)(a series of articles 
on various aspects of school finance litigation and reform). 
48
to crime as a primary means of undermining reform movements 
and preserving their privileged status.66 
It is true that capital punishment entails life-life 
trade-offs, and it may be that capital punishment saves 
innocent lives.  But so would other less draconian means of 
addressing crime, means that would move this society in a 
more just direction and preserve life in other respects as 
well, and there is no way to know with any assurance which 
approach or combination of approaches will most effectively 
protect life.  Under those conditions justice requires a 
decision-making process in which all society’s members, and 
in particular those classes that disproportionately suffer 
from crime and punishment, have proportionate input into the 
process.  And that does not exist today. 
The foregoing analysis is particularly poignant as 
applied to African Americans.67 The facts are that the 
murder rate is much higher in the black than in the white 
 
66 See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICAN POLITICS (1997)(how society’s elites manipulate fear of crime for 
political advantage, leading to excessively punitive approaches to crime 
prevention in inner-city areas and roll-backs of social welfare 
programs); Sarah Eschholz, The Media and Fear of Crime: A Survey of the 
Research, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 39 (1997)(how politicians and 
the media exploit and overly exaggerate crime, leading to an 
overemphasis on crime prevention through punishment and producing “a 
distorted image of what is important and how social policy should be 
developed”).  
67 See, e.g., Bryan Stevenson, Close to Death: Reflections on Race and 
Capital Punishment in America, in BEDAU & CASSELL, supra note 12, at 76, 
85 (arguing that “endemic racial bias issues provide a particularly 
useful vehicle for demonstrating that the death penalty should be 
abandoned in this country”).  
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community,68 that most murders are intra-racial,69 and that 
the death penalty is substantially less likely to be imposed 
when the victim is black.70 Therefore, the implications of 
a societal obligation to practice capital punishment is that 
many more African Americans, and especially African-American 
males,71 should be executed than at present. 
Before proceeding to do so, morality requires that we 
ask why the cited facts pertain.  To me the inescapable 
explanation is that they are a by-product of this society’s 
racist past and of its failure yet to rectify the injustices 
 
68 Between 1976 and 2002, the homicide victimization rate per 100,000 
population among whites ranged between 3.3-6.1, whereas among African 
Americans it ranged between 20.4-39.3.  Fox & Zawitz, supra note 5, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/vracetab.htm. Between 1976 
and 2002, 51% of murder victims were white and 47% were black; of the 
offenders 46% were white and 52% black.  Id. at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/race.htm#vrace.
69 Between 1976 and 2002, 86% of white victims were murdered by other 
whites and 94% of black victims were murdered by other African 
Americans.  Id.
70 See, e.g., John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, 
Explaining Death Row’s Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMP. L. 
STUD. 165, 166-7 (2004)(finding, based on capital convictions between 
1977-1999, that African Americans are sentenced to death at lower rates 
than whites, and that the death-sentence rate is highest in white-
victim/black-offender cases, next highest in white-victim/white-offender 
cases, and lowest in black-victim/black-offender cases); Randall L. 
Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme 
Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1395-98 (1988)(discussing studies showing 
that offenders are more likely to receive the death penalty when the 
victim is white than black, including the famous Baldus study used in 
McClesky that found that the chance of receiving the death penalty was 
4.3 times greater when the victim was white than black).  Extrapolating 
from Blume et als. data, Sunstein and Vermeule find that the death-
sentence rate is 4.2 times greater in white-on-white than in black-on-
black murders.  Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 3, at __.  (Note that 
they also find the death-sentence rate to be by far the highest in 
black-on-white murders, where the rate is 2.2 times greater than in 
white-on-white murders, thus indicating a substantial prejudicial effect 
against black offenders when the victim is white.)  
71 The vast majority of murders are committed by males.  Between 1976 
and 2002, 89% of offenders were male and 11% were female.  Fox & Zawitz, 
supra note 7, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/gender.htm#osex.
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done to the black community.  The result of these injustices 
is reflected in virtually every aspect of American life.  
African Americans are grossly over represented on the 
poverty and unemployment roles, on the average have far 
lower family incomes and receive a far inferior education 
than whites, are still subjected to substantial overt 
discrimination in housing and employment, and are grossly 
underrepresented in the political process.72 An astounding 
one-third of African-American males under age 30 are either 
incarcerated or on probation or parole.73 As many as 60% of 
the thousands of African-American males likely to be 
executed with increased use of capital punishment fall into 
this age group.74 
72 On these points, see Thomas Kleven, Brown’s Lesson: To Integrate or 
Separate Is Not the Question, But How To Achieve a Non-Racist Society, 5
U. MD. L.J. OF RACE, REL., GEN. & CLASS 43 (2005) . 
73 This figure is extrapolated from the available data.  In 2003 an 
estimated 12% of black males in their 20s, and by extrapolation from the 
gross numbers about another 1% under 20, were incarcerated.  Paige M. 
Harrison & Jennifer C. Karberg, “Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 
2003,” U.S. Department of Justice Statistics Bulletin, at 11 & Table 13,  
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pjim03.pdf. Also in 2003 about 30% 
of those under correctional supervision were incarcerated, while more 
than twice as many (70%) were on probation (59%) or parole (11%).  Of 
the probationers 30% were black, of the parolees 41% were black, and 
more than 80% of those on probation or parole were males.  Lauren E. 
Glaze & Seri Palla, “Probation and Parole in the United States, 2003,” 
Tables 4, 7 & 8, U.S. Department of Justice Statistics Bulletin at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus03.pdf. If we assume a 
comparable age breakdown of those on probation or parole as those 
incarcerated, then an estimate of as many as 20%-24% of black males 
under 30 on probation or parole in addition to the 13% incarcerated 
seems in the ball park.     
74 Between 1976 and 2002, there were a total of 275,998 black male 
homicide offenders.  Black males between the ages of 18-24 represented 
41% of all these offenders, and black males aged 14-17 represented 
another 12%, for a total of 53%.  Fox & Zawitz, supra note 5, at 
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The impact on the black community of crime and of 
punitive approaches to dealing with crime has been 
devastating and will continue to be so with increased use of 
capital punishment.  Given the society’s racist heritage, 
its paramount moral obligation to the black community is to 
rectify the on-going injustices that contribute to such high 
crime and murder rates there.  This is not to excuse murder.  
But after creating the situation in the first place, for 
society to resort to the death penalty and to execute 
thousands of young, mostly male African Americans as a way 
to deter murder in the black community is doubly racist and 
smacks quite frankly of genocide.75 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/oarstab.htm. During that 
period, black males over 25 represented 46% of black male offenders, 
id., and  more than half of all homicide offenders of all races aged 25 
or above fell into the 25-34 age range.  Id. at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/tables/oagetab.htm. Assuming half 
of the 25-34 aged offenders fell between 25-29, it seems reasonable to 
presume that black males between 25-29 represented as many as 12% of all 
black male offenders.  This yields a total of at least 65% black male 
offenders under 30; if those under 18 are excluded, the total is 53%.  
Between 1977 and 2003, a total of 2,723 African Americans (representing 
about 1% of the black male offenders between 1976 and 2002) received 
death sentences, almost 99% of whom were males and about 62% of whom 
were under 30.  Bonczar & Snell, supra note 5, at 6, 7, 11.  This yields 
approximately 1,671 black males under 30 who received death sentences.  
If in response to a push to increase capital punishment as a means of 
deterrence the death sentence rate were to rise to 5%-10% of offenders, 
it is not a stretch to project that many thousands of black males under 
30 would be executed.      
75 Given the racist history of this society and the uniqueness of the 
African-American experience, it cannot be assumed that studies 
purporting to show that in general capital punishment deters murder 
apply as well to the black and white communities.  Only one of the 
recent studies controlled for race, and it did find a deterrent effect 
for both white and black victims.  Shepherd, Murders of Passion, supra 
note 1.  One study hardly seems enough to warrant executing thousands of 
African Americans.   
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Perhaps this explains, despite the far higher incidence 
of murder in the black community, why support for capital 
punishment there is far weaker than among whites.76 Even if 
capital punishment deters murder in the black community in 
the short run, the community might perceive it as unjust and 
as distracting society’s attention from addressing societal 
racism, thereby perpetuating the conditions that cause 
murder in the black community and in the long run resulting 
in more deaths from murder and execution combined than if 
society did the right thing now.  In a society still divided 
along race lines as a result of societal racism, and with 
the impact of an increased use of the death penalty to be 
highest in the black community, its view of capital 
punishment should be respected and not lightly overridden. 
D.  Conclusion 
 
76 A 2003 Gallup poll found that 67% of whites favored and 29% opposed 
the death penalty for murder, whereas for African Americans the figures 
were 39% in favor and 54% opposed.  Sourcebook of Criminal Justice 
Statistics Online at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t250.pdf.  In 
a 2001 Harris poll the figures were: 73% of whites in favor of the death 
penalty and 22% opposed; 46% of African-Americans in favor and 43% 
opposed.  Sourcebook 2002, Table 2.46 at http://www.albany.edu/ 
sourcebook/pdf/section2.pdf. Public opinion regarding capital 
punishment has fluctuated over the years.  Annual Gallup polls show 
public support versus opposition to the death penalty at 68%/25% in 
1953, declining to a low of 42%/47% in 1966, rising to a high of 80%/16% 
in 1994, declining again to 65%/27% in 2001, and rising to 71%/26% in 
2004.  At http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/opinion.htm.
However, support for capital punishment is less when the question asked 
is whether death or life imprisonment is the better penalty for murder.  
In 1985 56% favored death and 34% life, rising to a high of 61% favoring 
death and 29% life in 1997, and declining to 50% favoring death and 46% 
life in 2004.  Death Penalty Information Center at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did=1029.
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Sunstein and Vermeule are well respected and 
influential scholars, and Sunstein has established a 
reputation as one of the academy’s leading liberal voices.  
As such, their touting of capital punishment may have a 
significant impact in lending support to efforts to expand 
the use of capital punishment in this society.  As a result, 
many more people could be executed, most will be young men, 
most from disadvantaged circumstances, and a staggeringly 
disproportionate number will be African American.  Those 
facts should give us pause, because they strongly suggest 
that something is wrong with the system and that extending 
capital punishment will only perpetuate and worsen the 
injustices of the society. 
Sunstein’s and Vermeule’s argument is sophisticated and 
erudite, but in my view it is overly abstract and fails to 
take into account historical context and practical 
consequences.  As such, it brings to mind a line from a Tom 
Lehrer song of yesteryear:  “Once the rockets are up, who 
cares where they come down?  That’s not my department says 
Wernher von Braun.”77 
77 “Wernher von Braun” in the album “That Was the Year That Was.” 
